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shows that, strikingly, many hedge fund style indices performed extremely poorly on the same dates in August 2007 even though the indices correspond to very different hedge fund strategies.
Why would a hedge fund index of global macro funds perform poorly when an index of funds investing in distressed securities also has poor performance? In this paper, we first examine whether such clustering of poor hedge fund returns is unusual. We find that the worst hedge fund returns, defined as returns that fall in the bottom 10% ("10% tail returns") of a hedge fund style's monthly returns for the period January 1990 to August 2007, cluster. Further, we show that this clustering cannot be explained by risk factors typically used in analyzing the returns of hedge fund styles. Given these facts, worst return clustering can result either from exogenous common shocks that have a pervasive impact across hedge fund styles or from contagion. We investigate these explanations in turn.
Recent literature has emphasized the importance of liquidity risk, but liquidity risk factors are not explicitly modeled in the hedge fund performance literature. We therefore examine the possibility that liquidity shocks explain the clustering of worst returns. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) provide a theoretical model highlighting the importance of asset liquidity and funding liquidity for financial institutions which shows how these two forms of liquidity can interact to worsen asset price decreases. In their model, a large adverse shock to asset liquidity reduces the ability of financial intermediaries to finance their asset holdings due to higher margin requirements resulting from the decrease in asset liquidity. Such shocks also have an adverse impact on the financial institutions that advance credit to hedge funds, forcing them to cut back in their lending. With this perspective, large adverse shocks to asset liquidity reduce the credit available to hedge funds and force them in turn to reduce their leverage. The de-leveraging of hedge funds and financial institutions leads to mark-to-market losses, which have an adverse impact on funding conditions and on the provision of liquidity to the asset markets. Alternatively, a shock to the capital of financial institutions could force them to sell assets and reduce their provision of liquidity to the markets. As asset liquidity falls, financial institutions would find it harder to fund themselves, forcing them to reduce their leverage even more. Mutually reinforcing liquidity spirals would lead hedge funds to experience worst returns at the same time regardless of style, because all hedge funds would simultaneously face high trading costs and the need to de-lever. These high trading costs would increase deleveraging costs and would limit profitable trading opportunities.
The impact of asset liquidity and funding liquidity shocks should intrinsically be nonlinear. Small shocks do not cause the liquidity spirals modeled by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) ; large shocks do.
A large liquidity shock is a common shock across the hedge fund industry, making it more likely that all hedge funds will perform poorly in response. In the following, we refer to the liquidity shock explanation for clustering of hedge fund worst returns as the "liquidity common shock" explanation. With this explanation, the shock could originate anywhere. We find strong support for this explanation of clustering: both contemporaneous and lagged liquidity shocks are associated with clustering of worst returns across hedge fund styles. Further, clustering of worst returns forecasts liquidity shocks, which is consistent with the feedback (spiral) effects emphasized in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) .
Clustering could also result from hedge fund contagion. The finance and economics literature often uses the term contagion to describe a situation where, to borrow the language of Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) , there is excess correlation for reasons not related to fundamentals, and poor performance spreads across countries, asset classes, or investment strategies. Clustering of worst returns is a form of excess correlation. However, testing for contagion is challenging because excess correlation could be explained by common factors not accounted for in the model predicting returns, which would not be evidence of contagion. Even if common shocks that explain clustering cannot be identified, it could still be possible for unknown risk factors, so-called frailty factors (Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2006) ), to account for the clustering. Therefore, for hedge fund contagion to be responsible for the clustering, extreme poor performance in one sector of the hedge fund industry must propagate to other hedge fund sectors, as opposed to a situation where a large exogenous adverse shock causes clustering. The contagion literature has its origins in the international finance literature that focuses on currency crises and emerging markets. Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000) review the many possible definitions of contagion. There are at least two possible channels for such contagion. One possible channel emphasized in explaining the events of August 2007 (see Khandani and Lo (2007) ) is the multi-strategy fund channel.
With this explanation, multi-strategy funds active in a style that suffers significant losses reduce their leverage by selling assets in other styles, causing losses in these styles because of price pressure effects.
Hedge fund contagion could also take place if a worst return in a hedge fund style affects funding liquidity adversely throughout the financial services industry, perhaps because it weakens prime brokers and leads them to withdraw liquidity from funds, forcing them to liquidate positions and suffer market impact costs. With this narrow definition of contagion, worst returns should spread from one hedge fund style to others. With the monthly index data we use in this paper, we can explore this possibility by investigating whether lagged worst returns in one hedge fund style are followed by worst returns in other styles. However, such an analysis has the inherent limitation of failing to uncover contagion when it exists but takes place within a month.
To investigate clustering of worst returns for hedge fund styles, we use monthly hedge fund index return data from HFR (Hedge Fund Research) for eight different single hedge fund styles and identify as a worst return for a given style a return in the bottom 10% of its return time series. We use the logit regression methodology of the contagion literature (see Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) ) to estimate how the probability of a worst return for a hedge fund style index is related to the number of other hedge fund style indices that experience a worst return. This method is especially appropriate to study clustering for hedge fund returns because it is well-known that hedge fund returns are not normally distributed, so correlation may not be an appropriate measure of dependence. 2 We use as independent variables the returns of the main markets and other hedge fund styles to allow for the impact of correlation on the likelihood of occurrence of worst returns, as well as a number of fundamental hedge fund risk factors and control variables, including liquidity proxies, to control for the general levels of asset and funding liquidity. In addition, we allow for hedge fund returns to be related to worst returns on market indices to insure that our results cannot be explained by tail dependence between hedge fund returns and returns on main markets. To model clustering of worst returns across hedge fund styles we use a variable called COUNT, which ranges in value from zero to seven and is defined as the number of other hedge fund styles that have worst returns in the same month. In interpreting our results, a positive and significant coefficient on the COUNT variable is evidence of clustering of hedge fund worst returns.
We perform eight logit regressions, one for each hedge fund style where the dependent variable is set to 1 if the hedge fund style of interest has a worst return and 0 otherwise, and find strong evidence of clustering of worst returns within the hedge fund sector. Specifically, the coefficient on the COUNT variable is positive in seven of the eight regressions and is significant at the 10% level or better in four of the eight regressions. The economic significance of this clustering is large. If all the explanatory variables are set to their mean values and COUNT is allowed to vary, the average probability that a style index has a worst return increases from 2% to 19% as COUNT increases from zero to seven.
After documenting the existence of worst return clustering among hedge fund styles, we examine the potential explanatory roles of asset and funding liquidity shocks as modeled by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) . We construct six liquidity shock proxies, four for funding liquidity and two for asset liquidity. Two well-documented proxies for funding liquidity include credit spreads and repurchase volume. Adverse shocks to liquidity are accompanied by a widening of credit spreads and a decrease in repo volume (see, for example, Fama and French (1989) and Adrian and Fleming (2005) ). Further, a sharp reduction in funding liquidity can lead to liquidations across the hedge fund sector, a reduction in asset liquidity, and mark-to-market losses that cannot be explained by traditional risk factors for hedge fund returns. Prime brokers are direct lenders to hedge funds. Shocks to the capital of prime brokers force them to contract lending to hedge funds, thereby reducing funding liquidity for these funds. To capture the impact of shocks to funding liquidity for hedge funds, we construct a prime broker stock indexconsisting of the stock returns of 11 major prime brokers -as our third proxy, and use a broader-based bank stock index provided by Thomson Financial as our fourth proxy for funding liquidity.
To evaluate the role of shocks to asset liquidity, we use the stock market liquidity variable suggested by Chordia, Sarkar, and Subramanyam (2005) . This measure may be interpreted as the change in the average round-trip cost of a trade on the NYSE and is frequently used in the market microstructure literature to measure stock market liquidity. We use flows to hedge funds as our final proxy for asset liquidity. If poor performance of hedge funds leads investors to request redemptions, hedge funds will liquidate assets to honor these redemption requests. If levered, they must liquidate more assets than anticipated to meet redemptions. These liquidations could lead to price pressure and mark-to-market losses if they are substantial. 3 Further, funds that must meet redemptions would supply less liquidity to the markets. For all six liquidity shock proxies we also construct extreme liquidity shock dummy variables set to 1 if the change in the corresponding liquidity variable is in the bottom 25 th percentile of liquidity and 0 otherwise.
We use a multinomial regression analysis to perform the extreme liquidity shock tests. The dependent variable, called OCCUR takes on three possible values: 0 (base case or no clustering) if 0 or 1 hedge funds have a worst return in a given month, 1 (low clustering) if 2 or 3 hedge funds have worst returns in a given month, and 2 (high clustering) if 4 or more hedge funds have worst returns in a given month. The regression framework is used to explain different levels of OCCUR with a number of control variables and the liquidity shock dummy variables. Since data are measured at the monthly level, it is not obvious how quickly liquidity in asset and funding markets will be reflected in hedge fund performance, so we perform two separate analyses for each of the liquidity shock dummy variables: one in which the liquidity shock dummy is measured contemporaneously with OCCUR and one in which the liquidity shock dummy is lagged one month. We find that both contemporaneous and lagged liquidity shock dummies are linked to high levels of worst returns clustering for hedge fund styles. The economic significance of the relation we uncover is strong. For example, with respect to funding liquidity, the probability that four or more hedge funds will experience a worst return increases by about 15 percentage points as the lagged credit spread dummy variable goes from 0 to 1 (which indicates a tightening in the 3 We use contemporaneous flows and future flows to account for lock-up provisions.
credit markets). In addition, with respect to asset liquidity, the probability that four or more hedge funds will experience worst returns increases by about 11 percentage points as the lagged Chordia, Sarkar, and Subramanyam (2005) stock illiquidity dummy variable goes from 0 to 1.
Having established a strong link between extreme liquidity shocks and clustering, we next investigate whether our evidence can be explained by hedge fund contagion. We first investigate whether there is supportive evidence for the multi-strategy hedge fund channel. We would expect that more funds would experience worst returns following a month in which multi-strategy hedge funds experience a worst return, controlling for other determinants of worst returns we have identified. We find mixed evidence: it is more likely that two or three styles will experience worst returns following a worst return by multistrategy funds, but it is less likely that four or more styles will experience worst returns.
Our evidence could also the result from the liquidity channel of contagion discussed earlier. As a preliminary investigation we test whether clustering of worst returns of hedge fund styles predicts extreme liquidity shocks, and we find evidence supportive of this prediction. We then directly investigate whether worst returns in each style in one month make it more likely that other hedge fund styles will experience worst returns in the next month. We find evidence of contagion for worst returns of convertible arbitrage and merger arbitrage funds, but not for other styles. Taking all the styles together, however, there is no conclusive evidence of contagion.
Our paper contributes to an increasing literature about correlation and clustering of extreme returns of hedge fund styles. Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2005) analyze the systemic risk of hedge funds using regression models that allow for nonlinearities in the relation between hedge fund returns and main market returns as well as regression models that allow for regime shifts. Their analysis reveals a positive correlation between bank returns (measured using a broad-based bank index from CRSP) and hedge fund returns after controlling for a nonlinear relation between the S&P 500 return and hedge fund returns. They suggest as an explanation for this finding the use of hedge fund strategies by banks'
proprietary trading desks. Khandani and Lo (2007) investigate the factors that led to large losses in long/short equity funds (i.e., quant funds) during August 2007 and hypothesize that these losses were caused by a rapid unwinding of trades on a proprietary-trading desk or large hedge fund due to losses in unrelated strategies. Their paper therefore provides an example where hedge fund worst return clustering results from forced liquidations in funds that are active in different styles. Billio, Getmansky, and Pelizzon (2007) examine hedge fund risk exposures in a regime-switching model. They show that when volatility is high, the four strategies they examine have exposure to proxies for liquidity and credit risk. Klaus and Rzepkowski (2008) investigate mortality patterns of hedge funds and find evidence of contagion effects that are stronger within styles than across styles. Finally, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) use quantile regressions to document the increase in a measure of the risk of hedge funds, i.e., value-at-risk (VaR), conditional on other hedge fund styles experiencing financial distress. They explain within-sector hedge fund VaR contagion using various factors including volatility, credit spreads, repo spreads, and returns on the main markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the data for the hedge fund index returns and the explanatory variables. Section II uses monthly hedge fund indices and documents clustering of worst returns within the hedge fund sector. Section III examines possible economic explanations for the clustering using proxies for funding liquidity and asset liquidity. Section IV examines whether the clustering can be explained by hedge fund contagion. We attempt to interpret our results and conclude in Section V.
I. Data
The hedge fund style returns are the monthly style index returns provided by Hedge Fund Research (HFR). The returns are net of fees and are equally-weighted averages of fund returns. Since hedge fund returns are autocorrelated, we standardize the hedge fund returns (and all other variables used in the paper) using AR-GARCH models to control for autocorrelation and volatility 4 See Appendix A for definitions of each style category. 5 The source for these indices is Thomson Financial's DataStream.
clustering. The residuals from these models are then used in our analyses. 6 The approach of filtering a time-series with a GARCH process and using the residuals in the analysis has been proposed in the risk management literature in applications of conditional extreme value theory (EVT) for financial time-series.
In particular, McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2005) suggest using GARCH models to obtain a time-series for which extreme observations are not clustered and, hence, are suitable to estimate the tail distribution based on Generalized Pareto Distributions (GDP). Our filtering procedures of the original series with AR-GARCH processes can be viewed in light of these EVT applications where we remove clustering of extreme events that are due to periods of heightened volatilities.
The relatively high correlations we observe among hedge fund indices and between hedge fund indices and market indices indicate the importance of controlling for correlation in our clustering tests to ensure that we do not mistake for clustering of worst returns the normal workings of correlation. We control for the relationship between hedge fund returns and market returns in our tests by including the returns on the main market factors as well as the returns on the other hedge fund indices as explanatory variables. Thus, our approach is carefully constructed to test for clustering of worst returns over and above the linear relationship implied by these relatively high correlations.
II. Tests of clustering of worst returns using HFR index data
We use a lower 10% cutoff of the overall distribution of returns to identify worst returns. Given the number of observations in our sample, with such a cutoff, we have 21 worst returns for each style. Had we chosen a 5% cutoff instead, we would have only ten observations per style. The question we want to answer is whether worst returns cluster. A logit model allows us to answer this question by estimating whether a given style is more likely to have a worst return when other styles have worst returns. Logit models have been used extensively in the contagion literature (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) ).
The dependent variable in our basic regression specification is an indicator variable set to one if the hedge fund index under study has a standardized return in the bottom 10% of all returns for that index, and zero otherwise. Independent variables include the three main market indices: the Russell 3000, the LB bond index, and the FRB dollar index. Further, we control for the returns of the other seven hedge fund indices, measured as an equally-weighted index of these indices. We also include indicator variables for worst returns in the main market indices (set to one if the return for that month is in the bottom 10% of all returns for the index). Finally, to measure the extent of clustering of worst returns, we add the variable COUNT, which is equal to the number of hedge fund styles (other than the style whose performance is under study) that have a worst return in the same month. A positive and significant coefficient on this variable indicates that worst returns for a style cluster with worst returns in the other styles. Our tests are robust to including separately the individual returns for the other hedge fund indices rather than our more parsimonious approach which aggregates this data. Figure 2 shows the number of hedge fund styles that have a worst return in a given month over our sample period. As expected, this number is at its maximum at the time of the Long Term Capital crisis and at the start of the more recent subprime crisis. It is useful to note that if hedge fund style returns were independent and there was no clustering, we would expect to observe only one instance in which four or more styles have worst returns in the same month. Instead, we observe 15.
Results are presented in Table II . Focusing first on the continuous variables, there are no distinctive patterns in the coefficients on equities, bonds, or currencies, indicating no consistent relationship between hedge fund worst returns and the performance of broad markets. For the indicator variables, the coefficients on the main markets are mostly insignificant and yield inconsistent signs. Of the 24 indicator variables, 15 are negative, of which three are statistically significant, and nine are positive, of which three are statistically significant. These results provide no evidence that hedge fund styles' worst returns cluster with main markets' worst returns. By contrast, the results for the COUNT variable provide strong evidence of clustering within the hedge fund industry. Seven of the eight coefficients on the COUNT variable are positive and of these seven, six are statistically significant at least at the 10% probability level. Importantly, this evidence is obtained when controlling for the equally-weighted returns of the other hedge fund styles indices, so that we fully allow correlation to play its role.
Since Fung and Hsieh (1997) , it is well-known that hedge funds pursue strategies with highly nonlinear payoffs. 7 It could therefore be the case that strategies with non-linear payoffs explain the clustering of worst returns for hedge fund styles. This would be true if the non-linear strategies employed by hedge funds have correlated payoffs when the underlying assets have worst returns. In this case, the trading strategies of hedge funds would explain the clustering we observe. To control for these non-linearities, we follow Hsieh (2001 and 2004) and include additional risk factors using asset-based factors that are designed to mimic the returns of certain types of hedge fund strategies. These factors are lookback straddles on bonds, currencies, commodities, short-term interest rates, and equities, a size-spread factor (the Wilshire Small Cap 1750 monthly return minus Wilshire Large Cap 750 monthly return), a bond factor (the monthly change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield), and a credit spread factor (the change in the monthly spread of Moody's Baa yield less the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield).
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Also, because the volatility in the main market indices could be related to hedge fund styles' worst returns, we include a measure of monthly volatility extracted from the univariate GARCH models for each of the main market factors used in Table II . Finally, we add to the regression the return on the 3-month Treasury bill, and the negative portion of the S&P index return to proxy for a put option. We find (but do not reproduce the results in a table) that our evidence of clustering holds when we include all these additional risk factors.
A large recent literature suggests that liquidity risk is pervasive and is often priced in asset returns. Additionally, liquidity is relevant to hedge fund performance because it affects trading costs and funding costs. Following this prior literature and casting a wide net, we construct six separate liquidity proxies (four for funding liquidity and two for asset liquidity) in an attempt to control for "unobservable" liquidity risk. We then add these liquidity proxies to the regressions that include all the hedge fund risk factors discussed in the previous paragraph.
Our first funding liquidity proxy is a prime broker stock index (PBI). Prime brokers are the main providers of funding to hedge funds. We expect a decrease in funding liquidity for hedge funds to result from an adverse shock to prime brokers. The index consists of 11 prime brokerage firms: Goldman Sachs, We use credit spreads and repo volume as our third and fourth funding liquidity proxies. It is wellknown that a component of credit spreads is compensation for liquidity risk so that a possible cause for an increase in spreads is greater compensation for that risk. 12 We use the Baa minus the 10-year T-Note yield spread used by Fung and Hsieh (2004) for this proxy. Finally, low volume in the repo market could indicate a reduction in funding liquidity; for example, Kambhu (2006) finds a relationship between hedge fund distress and low repo market volume, and Adrian and Fleming (2005) argue that while not perfect, net repo volume is related to dealer leverage. We therefore use the difference between overnight repo and reverse overnight repo volume as the fourth liquidity proxy. 13 This variable is only available at the weekly frequency. We average the weekly observations for each month to obtain a monthly net volume measure, and then use as our independent variable the relative change in that measure.
As discussed in the introduction, sales of assets by hedge funds will have a larger impact on hedge fund performance when asset liquidity is low. As hedge funds must sell holdings, they will liquidate even more assets if markets are illiquid because in such markets liquidations push asset prices down. We employ as our first proxy for asset liquidity the liquidity measure of Chordia, Sarkar, and Subramanyam (2005) . 14 This variable may be interpreted as the change in the average round-trip cost of a trade on the NYSE and is frequently used in the market microstructure literature to measure stock market liquidity.
Although this measure is calculated for the stock market, Chordia, Sarkar, and Subramanyam (2005) show that reduced liquidity in the stock market is associated with reduced liquidity in other markets.
Asset liquidity is also important because hedge funds often provide liquidity to the markets. As these hedge funds perform poorly, their difficulties lead to a withdrawal of liquidity from the markets, forcing other hedge funds to decrease their positions because of the decrease in liquidity and to experience markto-market losses because of price pressure.
Finally, we use hedge fund outflows as our final proxy for liquidity. If poor performance of hedge funds causes investors to request redemptions, hedge funds will likely need to liquidate assets, possibly more assets than required to meet redemptions if they are highly levered. These liquidations could put pressure on prices and lead to mark-to-market losses. Further, as hedge funds liquidate assets, they provide less liquidity to markets. Since we do not have access to the HFR individual fund database, we calculate monthly net fund flows for hedge fund styles using the Lipper TASS (formerly Tremont Advisory Shareholder Services) hedge fund database. Net fund flows are calculated for each hedge fund separately and aggregated by fund style. We then calculate the monthly percentage change in net fund flows for the entire style index. 15 We consider both contemporaneous and one month ahead net fund flows. Typically, hedge funds do not allow investors to redeem within a month, so that next month's flows may contain redemptions requested during the current or prior month. The obvious difficulty with interpreting flow variables is that large net outflows may also result from poor returns. with the exception of the correlation between the Prime Broker Index and the Bank Index at 0.82. This high correlation is not too surprising, since all the firms in these indices are in the financial services industry. However, our results below indicate that there are important differences in the explanatory power of these two indices. To remove autocorrelation and volatility clustering, each liquidity proxy variable has been standardized using the same AR-GARCH processes as with all the other variables.
In the following analysis, we add the additional hedge fund risk factors (the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, our measures of main market volatility extracted from the AR-GARCH processes, the threemonth T-bill return, and the negative portion of the S&P 500 to proxy for a put option) and the change in the liquidity factors just described to the regressions from Table II . When we include all these new factors in that, the logit regressions sometimes fail to converge due to quasi-separation. Quasi-separation is not an uncommon problem in applications of discrete dependent variable models and is more likely to occur in settings with discrete explanatory variables, particularly in samples that are small relative to the number of explanatory variables. The issue is that if quasi-separation occurs, the maximum likelihood estimation procedure gives non-unique infinite parameter estimates with an unbounded dispersion matrix.
17 Therefore, to test our hypotheses while controlling for these additional factors, we use a stepwise regression approach. Starting with the null model containing only the constant term, successive models are created, each using one more regressor than the prior model. Potential additional regressors are selected from the list of all explanatory variables excluding the COUNT variable. To choose which regressor to add to the model in this "forward step", each potential regressor is tested by separately including it in the current model. We next evaluate the economic significance of this clustering. The average return of a particular style is strongly related to the number of other styles that experience worst returns. On a univariate basis, the difference in average returns for each style index when all other styles experience worst returns, compared to the average return when none of the other styles experiences a worst return ranges from -1.80% to -7.15%. From a multivariate perspective, using the estimates of Table IV and setting all the explanatory variables at their means except for COUNT, the average (median) probability that a style index has a worst return increases from 1.7% (1.4%) to 18.9% (16.1%) as COUNT increases from zero to seven. Figure 3 shows this result graphically; for all style indices, the probability of a worst return increases as the COUNT variable increases. The increase is especially dramatic for the Distressed Securities, Event Driven, Equity Market Neutral, and the Relative Value styles. It is smaller for the Convertible Arbitrage, Equity Hedge, Merger Arbitrage, and the Global Macro styles.
Since we use hedge fund index data, a concern with our results is that hedge funds might be misclassified in indices. In this case, we could find that performance of indices is similar because some hedge funds pursue the same strategies even though they are classified into different styles. However, while this explanation could lead to an increase in correlations across hedge fund indices, there is no reason to believe that this problem would cause clustering of worst returns. In addition, we repeat all our analyses using the Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund indices. 18 The results are consistent with those obtained using the HFR database. Hence, we reject this explanation.
III. Clustering and Liquidity Shocks: The Multinomial Regression Approach
In this section, we examine whether large adverse shocks to asset and funding liquidity can help explain clustering of worst returns across hedge fund styles. To proxy for liquidity shocks, we create dummy variables for each of the six liquidity measures used in Table IV, To perform this analysis, we use a multinomial logistic regression model following Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) . Multinomial logistic regression models are used to estimate the probabilities associated with events captured in a polychotomous variable (see Maddala (1986) and Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) 
where ij I is an indicator variable that equals one if the ith observation is in the jth category, and zero otherwise.
Goodness-of-fit is measured using McFadden's (1974) pseudo-R 2 approach, where both unrestricted (full model) likelihood, L ω , and restricted (constants only) likelihood, L Ω , are compared:
To perform the multinomial regression, we create a new dependent variable OCCUR. We set OCCUR equal to 0, which we call "base case" or no clustering, if 0 or 1 hedge fund style indices have a worst return during the month, equal to 1, which we call "low" clustering, if 2 or 3 hedge fund style indices have worst returns during the month, and equal to 2, which we call "high" clustering, if 4 or more hedge fund style indices have worst returns during the month. In the regressions, we use the same approach as in Table IV , namely a stepwise regression since we face the same quasi-separation problems as before, with OCCUR as the dependent variable, where the independent variables from to illiquidity in the current period). The second set of six regressions, in Table VI , is identical to the regressions in Table V except these regressions use the one-month lagged measure of the liquidity shock proxy indicator variable instead of the contemporaneous measure (for the INDFLOW variable, we include both INDFLOW t-1 and INDFLOW t ). As noted earlier, the liquidity shock indicator variable for each of the liquidity proxies is set to one if the continuous liquidity proxy variable has a realization in the lowest quartile of liquidity and zero otherwise. While we would prefer using decile realizations of these variables, using decile indicator variables in the multivariate setting creates quasi-separation problems in the regressions, so we must resort to using quartiles. A positive and significant coefficient on a liquidity shock proxy indicator variable indicates that the variable is associated with increased hedge fund clustering of worst returns.
The multinomial logistic approach simultaneously estimates the parameters of the model for each category low and high of the OCCUR t variable separately relative to the base case. The results in Table V include the contemporaneous realizations of the liquidity shock variables, and provide evidence that several of these liquidity shock proxies are related to high levels of worst returns clustering. Specifically, liquidity shock proxies. However, it could be the case that these variables are important in explaining worst returns clustering, but since they are measured contemporaneously, the effects they have on clustering are not experienced by hedge funds until the following period. The results in Table VI, which include lagged values of the liquidity shock proxy indicator variables, support this conjecture. Here, the coefficients (for the high realization of OCCUR t ) on the bank index, stock liquidity, and repo liquidity shock proxies are all positive, and are statistically significant for both the stock market and the repo market proxies. In addition, all the liquidity shock proxy variables with the exception of INDFLOW t-1 have positive coefficients for the high realization of OCCUR t , and four are statistically significant.
To examine the economic significance of these results, we perform the following analysis. We calculate the probability of the possible realizations of the OCCUR t variable (base case, low, and high levels of clustering) for each of the liquidity shock proxy indicator variables, using the conditional means of the explanatory variables for each level of the OCCUR t variable. For example, for the high level of OCCUR t , all explanatory variables are set to their mean levels conditional on four or more hedge fund styles experiencing extreme tail returns. Then, the probability of the high level of OCCUR t is calculated separately for the liquidity shock variable of interest being equal to either 0 or 1. This analysis is done separately for each of the liquidity shock variables for each of the three possible realizations of the OCCUR t variable. Results using the contemporaneous liquidity shock proxy indicators are presented in Figure 4 (these correspond to Table V) , and results using the lagged liquidity shock proxy indicators are presented in Figure 5 (these correspond to Table VI ).
The results in Figure 4 , which use contemporaneous liquidity shock proxy indicators, show that the economic significance of the prime broker index, hedge fund flows, and credit spread liquidity shock proxies is substantial (in the chart, the impact of the contemporaneous and leading flow indicator variables are combined into one data point). For example, the probability of high clustering of hedge fund worst returns is increased by 54% when there is a large adverse shock to funding liquidity (as proxied by the prime broker index proxy), by 28% when there is a large adverse shock to hedge fund outflows, and by 19% when there is a large adverse shock to credit spreads.
Turning to the results in Figure 5 , which use lagged liquidity shock proxy indicators, we note that for all lagged liquidity shock indicator variables, there is an increase in the probability of worst returns clustering being high when there are large adverse liquidity shocks in the prior period. In this table, the lagged stock market liquidity shock indicator variable (INDSTKLIQ t-1 ) and the repo volume indicator variable (INDREPO t-1 ) are linked to high clustering in hedge fund worst returns: the probability of high clustering of hedge fund worst returns is increased by 11% when there is a large adverse stock market liquidity shock the previous month, and by 9% when there is a large adverse shock to the repo volume.
Results are also strong for the prime broker index, the hedge fund flows, and the credit spread liquidity shock proxies, indicating that the impact of these liquidity variables is felt by hedge funds quickly as evidenced by Figure 4 , but continues to be important in the next period. Overall, the results are strongest for the credit spread proxy, which indicates a 15% probability increase of having a high level of hedge fund worst returns clustering, and weakest for BANK t-1 which indicates a 3% probability increase, and is not statistically significant based on the results in Table VI. The results from Tables V and VI and Figures 4 and 5 are consistent with the prediction that a liquidity shock leads to worst returns across different hedge fund styles. However, such results could also be explained by contagion among hedge funds in the sense that the liquidity shocks could result from hedge fund contagion rather than cause the hedge fund worst return clustering.
IV. Is there Hedge Fund Contagion?
If clustering is the result of hedge fund contagion then poor performance would spread across hedge fund styles rather than result from a common shock. With this type of contagion, worst returns of one style would lead to poor performance of styles that, absent this worst return, would have had normal performance. The difficulty with testing contagion is that clustering of worst returns during a month could be explained by common shocks as well as by contagion. However, contagion implies that worst returns in one style cause an increase in the probability of worst returns clustering. In this section, we test this idea by exploiting the time-series of hedge fund style index returns. A finding that a worst return in one hedge fund style is followed in the next month by a higher probability of clustering of hedge fund style worst returns in other hedge fund styles would be supportive of the contagion explanation for clustering.
There is an important caveat to our tests: since our data is at the monthly frequency, it is possible that contagion across hedge fund styles could spread much faster and that our tests are not sensitive enough to detect this contagion.
Hedge fund contagion could occur through the multi-strategy fund channel highlighted by Khandani and Lo (2007) . With this channel, a large loss in one strategy pursued by multi-strategy funds forces the funds to de-lever. As a result, they will sell assets in other strategies, which will put pressure on prices unless the markets for these assets are highly liquid. HFR does not have a multi-strategy style index, so we construct an index identifying multi-strategy funds using the Lipper TASS database since 1994. 19 The difficulty with such an index is that the importance of multi-strategy funds grew over the sample period.
Nevertheless, we estimate a multinomial regression with the dependent variable OCCUR and we include as potential independent variables all the contemporaneous variables as well as the lagged continuous and indicator liquidity shock variables. We then add as an independent variable a dummy variable for lagged worst return for the multi-strategy fund index. The estimated regression is shown in the first column of Table VII . We find that a lagged worst return for the multi-strategy funds index makes it more likely that 19 The index is the value-weighted average return using all multi-strategy hedge funds included in the Lipper TASS database.
the hedge fund styles will experience two or three worst returns (low contagion), but less likely they will experience four or more returns (high contagion). A possible explanation for this result is that, if multistrategy funds generally focus on only a few styles, worst returns for multi-strategy styles could lead to contagion, but only to those few styles. With this interpretation, our result would be consistent with the analysis of Khandani and Lo (2007) , who emphasize liquidations of stock positions from multi-strategy funds.
Our next analysis, also reported in Table VII , examines whether a worst return for a hedge fund style index is associated with a higher probability of hedge fund worst return clustering for other hedge fund style indices next period. A possible explanation for such a form of contagion is the liquidity channel discussed earlier, but other explanations are also possible. For this analysis, we test each of the eight hedge fund indices separately by performing multinomial regressions in which the dependent variable is based on the COUNT variable from Table IV. Recall that the COUNT variable takes a value of 0 to 7 and is calculated separately for each of the eight hedge fund indices. Specifically, it counts the number of other hedge fund indices (besides the index of interest) that have worst returns in a given month. For the multinomial regressions, for each of the eight hedge fund indices, we create a categorical variable from COUNT (which we call COUNTCAT), which is set to "base case" or no clustering if no other hedge fund styles have worst returns, "low" clustering if 1 or 2 other hedge fund styles have worst returns, and "high"
clustering if 3 or more other hedge fund styles have worst returns.
For the potential independent variables we include all the contemporaneous variables from Table VI, and the lagged continuous and lagged indicator liquidity variables. As before, the ultimate set of variables included in each regression is selected through a stepwise regression approach. Finally, we add as an independent variable an indicator variable set to 1 if the hedge fund style of interest has a worst return in the prior month and 0 otherwise (lagged independent worst return). A positive and significant coefficient on this indicator variable provides evidence of hedge fund contagion via the liquidity channel.
The estimated regressions are shown in Columns 2 through 9 of Table VII, where the coefficients on the control variables are not reported for brevity. Focusing on the 16 coefficients on the "lagged worst return" variables, two for each regression representing low and high clustering in the dependent variable, 10 are positive (of which 2 -convertible arbitrage and global macro -are statistically significant) and 6 are negative (of which 2 are statistically significant). In summary, the evidence suggests that while worst returns in convertible arbitrage can lead to high levels of contagion in other styles and worst returns in global macro styles can lead to low levels of contagion in other styles through the liquidity channel, there is no evidence that other hedge fund styles' worst returns lead to contagion through this channel.
Though we do not reproduce the results in a table, we also estimate stepwise logit regressions identical to those performed in Table IV , in which one regression is estimated for each hedge fund style, for a total of 8 regressions. To these regressions (in which the dependent variable is set to 1 if the hedge fund style of interest has a 10% tail return and 0 otherwise) we add the lagged value of COUNT. By adding the one-month lagged measure of this variable we can test whether an increase in the number of hedge fund styles that experience worst returns in the last period impacts the probability that the hedge fund style of interest will experience a worst return in the current period even after controlling for the other fundamental factors and liquidity proxies. Hence, a positive and significant coefficient on lagged COUNT would be consistent with contagion from other hedge funds. We find three styles for which the lagged COUNT variable is positive and significant. These styles are convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, and event driven. However, we also find three styles with a significant negative coefficient on the lagged COUNT variable. These styles are equity market neutral, merger arbitrage, and relative value.
Importantly, adding the lagged COUNT variable has no impact on the contemporaneous COUNT variable.
The liquidity channel for contagion implies that a worst return in a hedge fund style leads to an adverse liquidity shock. Therefore, we directly investigate (but do not reproduce the results in a table) whether a clustering of hedge fund worst returns in one period makes it more likely that the next period will have a large adverse liquidity shock. We use a variable for large adverse liquidity shocks created by summing the indicator variables for large liquidity shocks, excluding the REPO variable since we only have data for this variable since 1994, and also excluding the one-period ahead FLOW variable. 20 We then create a categorical variable from this summary variable, which is set to 0 (base case) if no liquidity indicator variables have a large liquidity shock, 1 (low shock) if 1 or 2 liquidity indicator variables have a large shock, and 2 (high shock) if 3 to 5 of the liquidity indicator variables have a large shock. We then estimate a multinomial regression like the regressions in Table VII , where the dependent variable is this categorical variable. We use as our eligible independent variables (selected through a stepwise regression) all the contemporaneous variables except for the liquidity variables. We then add a one-month lagged variable COUNT8, which ranges from 0 to 8 and counts the number of hedge fund styles that experience worst returns in a given month, and find that a large liquidity shock is more likely to occur in a month following a high value of COUNT8. In other words, a high number of worst returns for hedge fund styles makes it more likely that there will be a high adverse liquidity shock, i.e., one where the sum of the liquidity shock indicator variables is at least three.
V. Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we use binomial logit and multinomial logit regression models to study the clustering of worst returns within the hedge fund industry. We find strong evidence that worst returns cluster across hedge fund styles. Specifically, after accounting for variables typically used in the literature to explain hedge fund style returns, we find that a hedge fund style is more likely to have a worst return (defined as a return in the lower 10% tail of returns) when other hedge fund styles also have a worst return. We find that the relation we document is highly economically significant: the average probability that a hedge fund style index has a worst return (lower 10% tail) increases from 2% to 19% as the number of other hedge fund style indices with worst returns increases from zero to seven.
After documenting that worst hedge fund style returns cluster, we investigate possible explanations for this result. The most natural explanation is that hedge fund styles are affected by common shocks that are not captured by the variables used in the literature to model hedge fund returns. Recent literature 20 Results including the REPO variable are quantitatively similar.
suggests that liquidity variables are related to asset returns. Further, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) imply that there are threshold effects for the impact of adverse shocks to liquidity on security returns, in that large shocks can generate liquidity spirals, which are self-reinforcing mechanisms where worsening of liquidity leads to drops in asset prices which worsen liquidity further. We show that hedge fund returns are related to proxies for liquidity. More importantly, we find that liquidity shocks have a non-linear relation with hedge fund returns. Using indicator variables to represent the worst liquidity shocks, we find that the worst liquidity shocks are associated with contemporaneous clustering of worst returns of hedge fund styles. We also show that lagged worst liquidity shocks predict a higher likelihood of worst returns of hedge fund styles.
Our evidence on the nonlinear relation between hedge fund returns and liquidity shocks could also be explained by hedge fund contagion. With this explanation, worst returns in one or several styles would be contagious and would lead to a higher probability of worst returns in other hedge fund styles. Such an explanation is intrinsically difficult to investigate with monthly data if contagion takes place at a higher frequency. Nevertheless, we conduct several tests for contagion using our monthly data. We find no evidence of systematic hedge fund contagion. Some of our evidence is supportive of a multi-strategy fund contagion channel as well as of contagion from selected hedge fund styles. Further research is required to reach more definitive conclusions on the importance of contagion within the hedge fund industry. Summary statistics for monthly data on eight HFR monthly hedge fund indices and three market factors used in the paper are reported below. The event of a worst return in each hedge fund style is separately modeled as the outcome of a binary variable and estimated as a Logit regression. A monthly return is classified as a "worst return" and the dependent variable is set to 1 if the return belongs to the bottom 10% of all returns of that style. The independent variables are described in Section II.2. The market indicator variables are set to 1 if the market of interest has a worst return for the month.
The COUNT variable takes a value from 0 to 7 and measures the number of other hedge fund indices that also have worst returns for the month. Below the coefficients are the t-values in parentheses. R 2 MAX is the scaled coefficient of determination suggested by Nagelkerke (1991) . Coefficients with *** , ** , and * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Summary statistics for monthly data on six funding and asset liquidity variables used in the paper are described below. The variables include: the monthly percent change in the BAA-AAA rated bond credit spread, the percent change in the Chordia, Sarkar, and Subramanyam (CSS, 2005) liquidity measure, the monthly percent change in repo volume, the monthly percent change in hedge fund flows as a percentage of assets (contemporaneous), the monthly returns from the Datastream bank index, and the monthly returns from the prime broker index. Further description of these variables is in Section III. The event of a worst return in each hedge fund style is separately modeled as the outcome of a binary variable and estimated as a Logit regression. A monthly return is classified as a "worst return" and the dependent variable is set to 1 if the return belongs to the bottom 10% of all returns of that style. The independent variables are described in Section II.2. The market indicator variables are set to 1 if the market of interest has a worst return for the month. The COUNT variable takes a value from 0 to 7 and measures the number of other hedge fund indices that also have worst returns for the month. A stepwise regression is used to generate a parsimonious model before COUNT is added. See Section II.2 for more detail. Below the coefficients are the t-values in parentheses. R 2 MAX is the scaled coefficient of determination suggested by Nagelkerke (1991) . Coefficients with *** , ** , and * are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The co-occurrence of extreme monthly negative returns in hedge fund style indices is modeled as the outcome of a variable (OCCUR t ) that takes the value of 0 if 0 or 1 hedge funds have a worst return during a given month (base case), 1 if 2 to 3 hedge funds have a worst return during a given month (low), and 2 if 4 or more hedge funds have a worst return in a given month (high) and is estimated as a multinomial logistic regression. A monthly return is classified as a "worst return" if it belongs to the bottom 10% of all returns of that style. The independent control variables are described in Section II.2, are identical to those used in Table IV , and are selected using the same stepwise regression procedure that is used for The clustering of worst returns in hedge fund style indices is modeled as the outcome of a variable (OCCUR t ) that takes the value of 0 if 0 or 1 hedge funds have a worst return during a given month (base case), 1 if 2 to 3 hedge funds have a worst return during a given month (low), and 2 if 4 or more hedge funds have a worst return in a given month (high) and is estimated as a multinomial logistic regression. A monthly return is classified as a "worst return" if it belongs to the bottom 10% of all returns of that style. The independent control variables are described in Section II.2, include all the variables and are selected using the same stepwise regression procedure that is used for Two separate tests investigating contagion as an explanation for worst returns clustering are performed. A "worst return" is defined as a return in the bottom 10% of all returns for a hedge fund style. All tests use a multinomial regression approach. The first analysis in Column 1 examines the impact of worst returns in multi-strategy funds on clustering of worst returns among the eight hedge fund styles. The dependent variable is OCCUR t as defined in Table V . We include as potential independent variables (selected using a stepwise regression approach) all the contemporaneous control variables as well as the lagged continuous and indicator liquidity shock variables from Table VI . We then add as an independent variable an indicator variable set to 1 if the multi-strategy fund index experiences a worst return in the prior period and 0 otherwise (a lagged worst return.) The second analysis of contagion is presented in Columns 2-9, and examines liquidity as a contagion channel. The dependent variable is COUNTCAT STYLE , which is calculated separately for each of the eight hedge fund styles, and is set to 0 (base case) if no other hedge fund styles besides the style of interest have a worst return, 1 (low clustering) if 1 or 2 other hedge fund styles have a worst return, and 2 (high clustering) if 3 or more other hedge fund styles have a worst return. The potential dependent variables selected using the stepwise regression approach are the same as for Column 1. We then add as an independent variable a dummy variable set to 1 if the hedge fund style of interest experiences a worst return in the prior period (a lagged worst return). For brevity, only coefficients on the contagion variables ("lagged worst return, style of interest") are reported. Below the coefficients are the t-values in parentheses. R 2 MAX is the scaled coefficient of determination suggested by Nagelkerke (1991 (-8.95 ) (-8.33 ) (-8.05 ) (-8.19 ) (-7.94 ) (-7.70 ) (-8.73 ) (-7.17 (-5.67 ) (-5.62 ) (-6.20 ) (-5.54 ) (-7.25 ) (-6.34 ) (-7.74 ) (-5.62 
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Convertible Arbitrage
Convertible Arbitrage involves taking long positions in convertible securities and hedging those positions by selling short the underlying common stock. A manager will, in an effort to capitalize on relative pricing inefficiencies, purchase long positions in convertible securities, generally convertible bonds, convertible preferred stock or warrants, and hedge a portion of the equity risk by selling short the underlying common stock. Timing may be linked to a specific event relative to the underlying company, or a belief that a relative mispricing exists between the corresponding securities. Convertible securities and warrants are priced as a function of the price of the underlying stock, expected future volatility of returns, risk free interest rates, call provisions, supply and demand for specific issues and, in the case of convertible bonds, the issue-specific corporate/Treasury yield spread. Thus, there is ample room for relative misvaluations.
Distressed Securities
Distressed Securities managers invest in, and may sell short, the securities of companies where the security's price has been, or is expected to be, affected by a distressed situation. Distressed Securities managers invest primarily in securities and other obligations of companies that are encountering significant financial or business difficulties, including companies which (i) may be engaged in debt restructuring or other capital transactions of a similar nature while outside the jurisdiction of Federal bankruptcy law, (ii) are subject to the provisions of Federal bankruptcy law or (iii) are experiencing poor operating results as a result of unfavorable operating conditions, over-leveraged capital structure, catastrophic events, extraordinary write-offs or special competitive or product obsolescence problems. Managers will seek profit opportunities arising from inefficiencies in the market for such securities and other obligations.
Negative events, and the subsequent announcement of a proposed restructuring or reorganization to address the problem, may create a severe market imbalance as some holders attempt to sell their positions at a time when few investors are willing to purchase the securities or other obligations of the troubled company. If manager believes that a market imbalance exists and the securities and other obligations of the troubled company may be purchased at prices below the value of such securities or other obligations under a reorganization or liquidation analysis, the manager may purchase the securities or other obligations of the company. Profits in this sector result from the market's lack of understanding of the true value of the deeply discounted securities. Results are generally not dependent on the direction of the markets, and have a low to moderate expected volatility.
Equity Hedge
Equity Hedge, also known as long/short equity, combines core long holdings of equities with short sales of stock or stock index options. Equity hedge portfolios may be anywhere from net long to net short depending on market conditions. Equity hedge managers generally increase net long exposure in bull markets and decrease net long exposure or even are net short in a bear market. Generally, the short exposure is intended to generate an ongoing positive return in addition to acting as a hedge against a general stock market decline. Stock index put options are also often used as a hedge against market risk. Profits are made when long positions appreciate and stocks sold short depreciate. Conversely, losses are incurred when long positions depreciate and/or the value of stocks sold short appreciates. Equity hedge managers' source of return is similar to that of traditional stock pickers on the upside, but they use short selling and hedging to attempt to outperform the market on the downside.
Equity Market Neutral "Equity market neutral" strategies strive to generate consistent returns in both up and down markets by selecting positions with a total net exposure of zero. Trading Managers will hold a large number of long equity positions and an equal, or close to equal, dollar amount of offsetting short positions for a total net exposure close to zero. A zero net exposure is referred to as "dollar neutrality" and is a common characteristic of all equity market neutral managers. By taking long and short positions in equal amounts, the equity market neutral manager seeks to neutralize the effect that a systematic change will have on values of the stock market as a whole.
Some, but not all, equity market neutral managers will extend the concept of neutrality to risk factors or characteristics such as beta, industry, sector, investment style and market capitalization. In all equity market neutral portfolios stocks expected to outperform the market are held long, and stocks expected to under perform the market are sold short. Returns are derived from the long/short spread, or the amount by which long positions outperform short positions.
Event Driven
Event Driven investment strategies or "corporate life cycle investing" involves investments in opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, industry consolidations, liquidations, reorganizations, bankruptcies, recapitalizations and share buybacks and other extraordinary corporate transactions. Event Driven trading involves attempting to predict the outcome of a particular transaction as well as the optimal time at which to commit capital to it. The uncertainty about the outcome of these events creates investment opportunities for managers who can correctly anticipate their outcomes. As such, Event Driven trading embraces merger arbitrage, distressed securities, value-with-a-catalyst, and special situations investing.
Some Event Driven Trading managers will utilize a core strategy and others will opportunistically make investments across the different types of events. Dedicated merger arbitrage and distressed securities managers are not included in the Event Driven index. Instruments include long and short common and preferred stocks, as well as debt securities, warrants, stubs, and options. Trading Managers may also utilize derivatives such as index put options or put option spreads, to leverage returns and to hedge out interest rate and/or market risk. The success or failure of this type of strategy usually depends on whether the Trading Manager accurately predicts the outcome and timing of the transactional event. Event Driven Trading Managers do not rely on market direction for results; however, major market declines, which would cause transactions to be repriced or break, may have a negative impact on the strategy.
Macro
Macro strategies attempt to identify extreme price valuations in stock markets, interest rates, foreign exchange rates and physical commodities, and make leveraged bets on the anticipated price movements in these markets. To identify extreme price valuations, Trading Managers generally employ a top-down global approach that concentrates on forecasting how global macroeconomic and political events affect the valuations of financial instruments. These approaches may be systematic trend following models, or discretionary. The strategy has a broad investment mandate, with the ability to hold positions in practically any market with any instrument. Profits are made by correctly anticipating price movements in global markets and having the flexibility to use any suitable investment approach to take advantage of extreme price valuations. Trading Managers may use a focused approach or diversify across approaches. Often, they will pursue a number of base strategies to augment their selective large directional bets.
Merger Arbitrage
Merger Arbitrage, also known as risk arbitrage, involves investing in securities of companies that are the subject of some form of extraordinary corporate transaction, including acquisition or merger proposals, exchange offers, cash tender offers and leveraged buy-outs. These transactions will generally involve the exchange of securities for cash, other securities or a combination of cash and other securities. Typically, a manager purchases the stock of a company being acquired or merging with another company, and sells short the stock of the acquiring company. A manager engaged in merger arbitrage transactions will derive profit (or loss) by realizing the price differential between the price of the securities purchased and the value ultimately realized when the deal is consummated. The success of this strategy usually is dependent upon the proposed merger, tender offer or exchange offer being consummated.
When a tender or exchange offer or a proposal for a merger is publicly announced, the offer price or the value of the securities of the acquiring company to be received is typically greater than the current market price of the securities of the target company. Normally, the stock of an acquisition target appreciates while the acquiring company's stock decreases in value. If a manager determines that it is probable that the transaction will be consummated, it may purchase shares of the target company and in most instances, sell short the stock of the acquiring company. Managers may employ the use of equity options as a lowrisk alternative to the outright purchase or sale of common stock. Many managers will hedge against market risk by purchasing S&P put options or put option spreads.
Relative Value Arbitrage "Relative value arbitrage" is a multiple investment strategy approach. The overall emphasis is on making "spread trades" which derive returns from the relationship between two related securities rather than from the direction of the market. Generally, Trading Managers will take offsetting long and short positions in similar or related securities when their values, which are mathematically or historically interrelated, are temporarily distorted. Profits are derived when the skewed relationship between the securities returns to normal. In addition, relative value managers will decide which relative value strategies offer the best opportunities at any given time and weight that strategy accordingly in their overall portfolio. Relative value strategies may include forms of fixed income arbitrage, including mortgage-backed arbitrage, merger arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, statistical arbitrage, pairs trading, options and warrants trading, capital structure arbitrage, index rebalancing arbitrage and structured discount convertibles (which are more commonly known as Regulation D securities) arbitrage.
